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PAYNE, VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS, AND
NEARLY TWO DECADES OF DEVOLVING
STANDARDS OF DECENCY
Joe Frankel*
“[A]s a matter of international law, there’s sort of a correspondence to
our evolving standards of decency that have generally governed our
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  It’s kind of a one-way ratchet, we
look at trends in one direction but we don’t look to see if you can sud-
denly change gears and go in the other direction.”
–Justice John Paul Stevens1
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INTRODUCTION
Pervis Payne is a polite, somewhat naı̈ve, mentally handi-
* Joseph Frankel, J.D. 2008, City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law.
Thank you to Sandra Dos Santos, Gregory Foley, Edward Frankel, Sarah Mugford,
and Professors Jeffrey Kirchmeier and Steve Zeidman.
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S.Ct. 1 (2008)
(No. 07-343).
87
88 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:87
capped2 man from Millington, Tennessee.3  As of this writing, he
remains in the cell on Tennessee’s death row4 that he has occupied
for nearly twenty years5 after his conviction for stabbing a mother
and daughter to death in their home.
Mr. Payne’s death sentence largely rests on two pieces of evi-
dence introduced at his sentencing hearing.  First, testimony of the
victims’ mother and grandmother regarding the emotional effect
of the crime on the victims’ family members was admitted.  Sec-
ond, the prosecutor focused on the character of the victims in clos-
ing arguments.6  The admission of this victim impact evidence was
a clear violation of then-existing law.
Booth v. Maryland, mandatory precedent at the time of Payne’s
trial, established a per se bar to victim impact statements during
the sentencing phase of capital trials.7  By the time of his appeal to
the Supreme Court of Tennessee, another case, South Carolina v.
Gathers, had extended the Booth rule to bar victim impact state-
ments read into evidence by a prosecutor.8  However, in Payne’s
case, the prosecutor violated the Tennessee Supreme Court prece-
dent by introducing testimony from the victims’ family members,
and the judge acquiesced.  On appeal, the high court found no
error,9 and eventually the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that deci-
2 Dr. John T. Hutson’s clinical evaluation described Mr. Payne’s personality as
“polite” and “somewhat naı̈ve.” State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 17 (Tenn. 1990), aff’d,
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).  An IQ test of Pervis Payne showed a Verbal
IQ score of 78 and Performance IQ of 82. Id.  Dr. Hutson testified that the clinical
norm was 100, with actual tests showing the norm closer to 110, and that 75 was typi-
cally classified as “retarded,” or more favorably, “mentally handicapped.” Id.
3 Id. at 14.
4 Tennessee Department of Correction Death Row List, http://www.tennessee.
gov/correction/deathrowlist.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
5 Pervis Payne’s original execution date was July 18, 1990. State v. Payne, 791
S.W.2d at 21.
6 Id. at 18–19.  Also introduced, over objection, was a videotape of the crime
scene, played during the sentencing hearing. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d at 17.
7 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987) (“We conclude that the introduc-
tion of a [victim impact statement] at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial
violates the Eighth Amendment, and therefore the Maryland statute is invalid to the
extent it requires consideration of this information.”).
8 Justice Brennan, in writing the plurality decision, noted that “[w]hile in this
case it was the prosecutor rather than the victim’s survivors who characterized the
victim’s personal qualities, the statement is indistinguishable in any relevant aspect
from that in Booth.”  South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811 (1989).
9 The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that there was no violation of Payne’s
rights under Booth and Gathers, and even if there was, it “was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.” State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d at 18–19.  In its effort to confront the
Booth/Gathers rule on its face, the Tennessee Court went as far as to recognize that
Gathers applies retroactively. Id. at 19.
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sion.  In Payne v. Tennessee, the Court held that the Eighth Amend-
ment does not pose a per se bar to victim impact statements in
capital cases10—a decision that stands in direct opposition to the
legal principles that existed at the beginning of Pervis Payne’s
case.11
Certainty is essential in the law.  Nowhere is this maxim more
important than in a capital sentencing decision because “death is
different.”12  In a common law system, certainty is achieved
through stare decisis.13  As Justice Stewart wrote in Woodson v. North
Carolina:
The penalty of death is different from a sentence of imprison-
ment, however long.  Death, in its finality, differs more from life
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of
only a year or two.  Because of that qualitative difference, there
is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case.14
Because “death is different,”15 a capital jury’s sentencing dis-
cretion must be tempered by “clear and objective standards as to
produce a non-discriminatory application.”16  Further, a capital
sentencing statute must provide a “meaningful basis for distin-
guishing the few cases in which the [death penalty is imposed]
from the many cases [in] which it is not.”17  To fulfill the “Gregg
mandate,”18 most states have adopted statutes which enumerate
certain aggravating factors that the prosecutor must prove before
10 Payne v. Tennesse, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
11 Id. at 830.
12 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (invalidating a mandatory
death penalty scheme because it both failed to address the concern of unbridled jury
discretion raised in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and did not allow for
individualized sentencing determinations).
13 Respect for precedent promotes certainty, allowing individuals to “arrange their
affairs with confidence,” assured that the law applied to them in the future will be the
same as currently applied.  William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735,
736 (1949).
14 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
15 Id.
16 Compare Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (upholding a capital sen-
tencing scheme which guides the jury’s discretion through the use of statutorily pre-
scribed aggravating factors) with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972)
(striking a capital sentencing scheme allowing for complete jury discretion).
17 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427–429 (1980) (holding the use of “outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman,” before the term “offense,” is an
aggravating factor that is unconstitutional because all murders could be described as
such and therefore no meaningful narrowing function is served).
18 See Tim Kaine, Capital Punishment and the Waiver of Sentence Review, 18 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 483, 518 (1983).
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the accused can be considered among the “worst of the worst”19
and therefore deserving of death.20
In addition to the requirement that a capital sentencing
scheme provide objective guidelines that meaningfully narrow the
class of death-eligible defendants, there is a seemingly contradic-
tory individualized sentencing requirement.  To withstand constitu-
tional muster a sentencing scheme must allow for “particularized
considerations of relevant aspects of the character and record of
each convicted defendant.”21  This mandate has been interpreted
as a requirement that a sentencer must consider, as a mitigating
factor, “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death.”22
Since Woodson, the guiding principle that “death is different”
has been a cornerstone of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  The
Court has consistently held that the Eighth Amendment provides
additional procedural protections for defendants when the possi-
ble punishment is death.23  This principle has given rise to two pro-
cedural mandates, out of which an unworkable tension arises.  One
mandate requires that a capital scheme provide objective guide-
lines that narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty;
the other requires a subjective, open-ended consideration of any
mitigating characteristic of the defendant or circumstance of the
crime.24  Juries are left to conduct an impossible undertaking when
they are asked to balance a subjective mitigating factor, such as the
severe childhood abuse suffered by the defendant, against objec-
tive aggravating factors, such as the number of victims killed.  This
tension has led at least one former Supreme Court Justice, Harry
19 Justice Souter used the phrase “worst of the worst” to describe the Gregg man-
date in his dissent in Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (citing Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (“Capital punishment must be limited to those
offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose ex-
treme culpability makes them “the most deserving of execution.’” (quoting Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002))).
20 Other states, such as Texas, fulfill the narrowing mandate by directing special
questions to the sentencing jury. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 2005).
21 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
22 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (invalidating the Ohio death penalty
statute because it limited mitigating factors to those enumerated in the statute).
23 See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478 (1986).  In fact, an electronic Westlaw search for the language “death is
different” returns twenty-three U.S. Supreme Court cases, starting with Woodson.
24 For an excellent analysis of how these two mandates contradict each other in
areas beyond the admission of victim impact evidence, see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Ag-
gravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital
Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 345 (1998).
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Blackmun, to conclude that the death penalty can never be im-
posed fairly and he would therefore “no longer tinker with the ma-
chinery of death.”25
The focus of this Comment is whether victim impact state-
ments—which are non-objective by nature—should be admissible
in capital sentencing procedures.  This Comment hopes to show
that victim impact statements have no place in the determination
of whether the capitally accused should live or die.26  Such evi-
dence, which does not address the defendant’s blameworthiness,27
serves neither of the two contradictory guiding principles of Eighth
Amendment law.  The seventeen years since Payne have shown us
that, in effect, victim impact statements are an arbitrary, non-objec-
tive, sentencing factor that is irrelevant to the culpability of the
individual defendant.
This Comment first introduces the historical political land-
scape from which victim impact legislation originates.  Part Two ex-
amines the limited body of Supreme Court case law regarding
victim impact statements.  Part Three surveys how the states and
federal systems integrated Payne into their legislation and court rul-
ings.  After Payne, the state laboratories have shown the decision’s
deficiencies.  Using the states’ treatment as a guide, the final part
of this paper will dissect the logic of Payne and offer suggestions for
living with Payne.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Since President Reagan first proclaimed observance of a Na-
tional Crime Victims’ Rights Week in 1981,28 the Victims’ Rights
Movement has gained momentum.29  The Victims’ Rights Move-
25 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Justice
Blackmun dissented in Furman and voted to uphold the death penalty in Gregg, but by
the end of his career concluded that the death penalty could never be fairly imposed.
Following Callins, Justice Blackmun dissented in every case upholding a death
sentence.
Notably, Justice Powell had a similar revelation to that of Justice Blackmun.  After
his retirement Powell stated he regretted his vote upholding the death penalty in
Gregg. See Kirchmeier, supra note 24, at 347; John C. Jeffries, Jr., JUSTICE LEWIS F.
POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451 (1994); John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Change of Mind that Came
Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1994, at A23.
26 Booth, 482 U.S. at 504.
27 Id.
28 Office for Victims of Crime, National Crime Victims’ Rights Week, http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/ncvrw/2005.html (last accessed Mar. 22, 2008).
29 See, e.g., Elizabeth Beck, et al., Seeking Sanctuary: Interviews with Family Members of
Capital Defendants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 382, 388–389 (2003) (noting that Reagan’s
proclamation was crucial for the Victims’ Rights Movement because it was the first
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ment is a loose populist coalition30 that advocates for increased vic-
tim participation in the criminal justice system.  In advancing its
goals, the movement lobbies for draconian treatment of the ac-
cused31 and evidentiary rules that result in unreliable decisions.32
time the word “right” was associated with a national crime victims movement). The
word “right” is a powerful rhetorical device in American history and culture and is
being used here for a conservative political agenda concerned with a crime control—
rather than a restorative—model of justice.  Lynne Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s
Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 952 (1985).
30 Identifiable elements of the Victims’ Rights Movement are the Law and Order
Lobby, Women’s Movement and General Victim Law Lobby.  John Gillis & Douglas
Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing Victim Rights Movement: Enforcing Crime Victim Rights
in the Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 690 (2002).
31 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 29, at 950 (stating that many states have adopted
“preventive detention” statutes at the behest of victims’ rights advocates).
32 Two examples of new evidentiary rules lobbied for by the Victims’ Rights Move-
ment are: rape shield laws and the use of “virtual” cross-examination.  Rape shield
legislation has been criticized for
its failure to distinguish between benign and invidious uses of sexual
conduct evidence. This failure stems from a misperception by the draft-
ers of the precise wrong to be redressed by reform legislation. The re-
sult is not merely bad evidence law; in many instances, the result is
constitutional problems that stem from unnecessarily broad
enactments.
Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the
Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 812 (1986).  For a thorough discussion on the
history of rape shield laws, and a different thesis from that asserted by Professor Gal-
vin, see Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Con-
sent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (2002).
Regarding the use of television in lieu of cross examination, see Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850–51 (1990) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s Confronta-
tion Clause does not prohibit the use of closed circuit television to avoid face-to-face
confrontation with the accused during the cross examination of an allegedly abused
child).  In his dissent, Justice Scalia wrote:
The “special” reasons that exist for suspending one of the usual guaran-
tees of reliability in the case of children’s testimony are perhaps
matched by “special” reasons for being particularly insistent upon it in
the case of children’s testimony. Some studies show that children are
substantially more vulnerable to suggestion than adults, and often una-
ble to separate recollected fantasy (or suggestion) from reality.
Id. at 868 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He points to three works, which speak to the vulner-
ability of children to suggestion. See D.S. LINDSAY & M.K. JOHNSON, REALITY MONITOR-
ING AND SUGGESTIBILITY: CHILDREN’S ABILITY TO DISCRIMINATE AMONG MEMORIES FROM
DIFFERENT SOURCES, IN CHILDREN’S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 92 (S. Ceci, M. Toglia, & D.
Ross eds. 1987); Thomas L. Feher, The Alleged Molestation Victim, The Rules of Evidence,
and the Constitution: Should Children Really Be Seen and Not Heard?, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L.
227, 230–233 (1987); John R. Christiansen, The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fan-
tasy, and the Influence of Pretrial Interviews, 62 WASH. L. REV. 705, 708–11 (1987).
Scalia begins his dissent with, “Seldom has this Court failed so conspicuously to
sustain a categorical guarantee of the Constitution against the tide of prevailing cur-
rent opinion.” Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  This is notably inconsis-
tent with his position on victim impact statements—where he invokes popular
opinion to justify his decisions. See infra note 245.
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Behind the movement lies the belief that the Warren Court went
too far in ensuring constitutional protections for the accused.33
The need for retributive justice and a goal of providing a meaning-
ful role for the victim in the criminal justice process also motivates
Victims’ Rights advocates.34
What is right is not always popular and what is popular is not
always right—this holds true in the area of victim participation in
capital sentencing.  The use of victim impact statements has gar-
nered popular support; but this alone does not make their use just.
In 2002, President Bush announced his support for the proposed
Federal Crime Victims’ Rights Amendment.35  Currently, every
state has a victim’s bill of rights.36  Many states have adopted gen-
eral legislation allowing prosecutors to use victim impact state-
ments in ordinary criminal matters.37  Following Payne, some states
incorporated the consideration of victim impact statements into
their capital sentencing proceedings through amendments to their
capital statutes.38  Other states allow such evidence through their
33 Professor Henderson notes that the victim’s movement is largely conservative
and focused on a “crime control model.”  Lynne Henderson, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937,
945–47 (1985).  She writes, “Conservatives have never truly accepted the Warren
Court’s concern for the rights of the accused: The exclusionary rule and Miranda
particularly irritated them . . . .  In their view, the courts were letting desperate
criminals loose . . . and preventing the police from protecting the innocent public
. . . .” Id. at 948.  Professor Henderson goes onto note that “victims” became an im-
portant political symbol for the conservative lobby, which was focused on undoing the
Warren Court’s work. Id. at 949.
34 Andrew Karmen, Who’s Against Victims’ Rights? The Nature of Opposition to Pro-
Victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 157, 161 (1992).
35 President Calls for Crime Victims’ Rights Amendment, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020416-1.html (last accessed Mar. 22, 2008).
36 The National Center for Victims of Crime, Victims’ Bill of Rights, http://ncvc.
microportals.net/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=documentViewer&DocumentID=32697
(last accessed Mar. 22, 2008).
37 See The National Center for Victims of Crime, Statistics: State Legislative Sum-
mary, http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=documentViewer&Documen-
tID=38725 (last visited January 29, 2009).
38 See, e.g., 17 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19.1 (d)(3) (2008):
Penalty Hearing in a Capital Case
. . . .
If a jury finds one or more aggravating circumstances, the penalty pro-
ceedings shall proceed as follows: (3) The victim’s survivors may make a
statement relating to the characteristics of the victim and the impact of
the crime on the victim’s family, but may not offer any opinion regard-
ing the appropriate sentence to be imposed.
See also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (c)(2) (2008):
Sentencing procedure for murder of the first degree
. . . .
The court shall instruct the jury that if it finds at least one aggravating
circumstance and at least one mitigating circumstance, it shall consider,
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general victim impact statutes39 or through regular evidence admis-
sions absent an authorizing statute.40
With the appointments of Justices Kennedy and Souter to re-
place Justice Powell, author of Booth, and Justice Brennan, veteran
of the Warren Court, the Supreme Court began to reflect the val-
ues of the populist conservative movements of the time,41 includ-
ing the Victims’ Rights Movement.  This shift in Supreme Court
personnel resulted in the Payne decision, which was largely based
on a new reading of the “individualized sentencing” mandate to
include “all relevant” evidence—not just all relevant mitigating evi-
dence as envisioned in Lockett.42  This new understanding of the
Eighth Amendment was based less on law and more on politics.
The Court cannot have its cake and eat it too.  If indeed “all
relevant” evidence is admissible, that evidence still must provide
“clear and objective standards as to produce a non-discriminatory
application.”43  Simply put, victim impact statements are personal
and subjective.  Victim impact statements, used as an aggravating
factor, are far from the “clear and objective standards” envisioned
in Gregg.
II. VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS AND THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT
A. Booth v. Maryland
The Victims’ Rights Movement emerged in part out of crime
victims’ perceived marginalization by the criminal justice system,
and a conservative backlash to the Warren Court.44  This loosely
defined movement has led to a sweep of legislative reforms ranging
in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, any evidence
presented about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the
victim’s family.
39 See, e.g., 22 OKLA. STAT. tit. § 984.1 (2003) (This section is titled “Presentation
and use of victim impact statement at sentencing and parole proceedings.”).
40 See, e.g., State v. Rhines, 548 N.W.2d 415, 446 (S.D. 1996) (South Dakota Su-
preme Court noted that Payne does not require victim impact evidence be treated
differently than any other relevant evidence and that therefore no statute explicitly
authorizing its admission was necessary).
41 See generally JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SU-
PREME COURT (2007) (arguing that the Court’s decisions are political and that justices
are selected based in part by lobbying of groups like the Federalist Society).
42 It has been noted that Booth was correctly decided under a defendant-preferred
analysis developed in Lockett and Woodson.  Steven Paul Smith, Unreliable and Prejudi-
cial: The Use of Extraneous Unadjudicated Offenses in the Penalty Phase of Capital Trials, 93
COL. L. REV. 1249, 1256 (1993).
43 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.
44 See Henderson, supra note 29.
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from rape shield laws to Megan’s law.45  A significant part of this
movement was the passage of victim impact legislation such as the
statute at issue in Booth.46  This type of legislation provided a vehi-
cle for the entry of victim impact statements into capital sentencing
hearings.47
In 1987, victim impact legislation was a new creation.  It faced
its first constitutional challenge in Booth v. Maryland, when the
Court considered whether the Constitution prohibits a jury from
considering a victim impact statement during the sentencing phase
of a capital murder trial.48  The Court concluded simply that
presenting victim impact statements in capital sentencing hearings
violates the Eighth Amendment.49
John Booth was found guilty of the murder of his neighbors
Irvin and Rose Bronstein.50  At Booth’s sentencing hearing a victim
impact statement was provided pursuant to a Maryland statute re-
quiring that a victim impact statement describing the effect of the
crime on the victim and his or her family be prepared in all felo-
nies.51  The victim impact statement included statements from the
Bronsteins’ granddaughter, son-in-law, daughter, and the son who
found the victims’ bodies two days after the murder.52  The son
testified that, as a result of the murders, he suffered from lack of
sleep and depression, and the granddaughter testified that she had
attended therapy but stopped because “no one could help her.”53
45 Bryan Myers & Edith Greene, The Prejudicial Nature of Victim Impact Statements,
Implications for Capital Sentencing Policy, 10 PSYCH. PUB. POL., & LAW 492 (2004).
Megan’s law is a general term used to describe sex offender registries.
46 Id.; Booth, 482 U.S. at 498; MD. CODE ANN. art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1986).
47 A typical victim impact statement: (a) identifies the offender; (b) indicates fi-
nancial losses suffered by the victim; (c) lists physical injuries suffered by the victim
including seriousness and permanence; (d) describes changes to the victim’s personal
welfare or familial relationships; (e) identifies requests for psychological services initi-
ated by the victim or the victim’s surviving family; and (f) contains other information
relating to the impact of the offense on the victim or the victim’s family.  Myers &
Greene, supra note 45; Booth, 482 U.S. at 498-99.
48 Booth, 482 U.S at 497.
49 Id. at 502.
50 Id. at 497–98.
51 Id. at 498. MD. CODE ANN., art. 41 § 4-609(c) (1986).  When enacted it was un-
clear whether the Maryland victim impact statute applied to capital sentencing.  Origi-
nally the law required, victim impact statement “if victim suffered injury.” MD. CODE
ANN., art. 41 § 4-609(c)(2)(i) (1986).  By the time Booth was decided it was amended
to clearly include capital prosecutions.  In 1983, the statute was amended to read, “In
any case in which the death penalty is requested . . . a presentence investigation,
including a victim impact statement, shall be completed by the Division of Parole and
Probation . . . ” MD. CODE ANN., art. 41 § 4-609(d) (1986).
52 Booth, 482 U.S. at 510.
53 Id. at 499–500.
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The son further testified that his parents were “butchered like ani-
mals,” and the daughter concluded such a person could “never be
rehabilitated.”54  Upon consideration of this evidence, the jury sen-
tenced Booth to death on one murder count and life in prison on
the other.
In Booth, the victim impact statement presented to the jury
contained two types of information.  First, it described personal
characteristics of the victims55 and the emotional impact the crime
had on the family.56  Second, it gave the family’s opinions and
characterizations of the crimes and the defendant.57  The Court
addressed these two distinct types of evidence separately in its
opinion.
Maryland made several arguments defending the admission
and consideration of victim impact statements.  First, the state ar-
gued that evidence of personal characteristics of the victim and the
emotional impact the crime had on the family should be admissi-
ble as a “circumstance of the crime.”58  The state argued this evi-
dence fully illustrates the harm of the defendant’s actions, and,
although not an enumerated aggravating factor in the capital sen-
tencing statute, such evidence allows the jury to better assess the
“gravity or aggravating quality” of the offense.59  The state also ad-
vanced the idea that victim impact statements are not arbitrary be-
cause there is a foreseeable nexus between the murder and the
harm caused to the family.60
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell rejected this argument
and invoked the doctrine that “death is different” by stating
54 Id. at 500.
55 For example, the victim impact statement given at Booth’s trial read:
[T]he victims’ son reports that his parents had been married for fifty-
three years and enjoyed a very close relationship, spending each day
together.  He states that his father had worked hard all his life and had
been retired for eight years.  He describes his mother as a woman who
was young at heart and never seemed like an old lady.  She taught her-
self to play bridge when she was in her seventies.  The victims’ son re-
lates that his parents were amazing people who attended the senior
citizens’ center and made many devout friends.  As described by their
family members, the Bronsteins were loving parents and grandparents
whose family was most important to them.  Their funeral was the largest
in the history of the Levinson Funeral Home and the family received
over one thousand sympathy cards, some from total strangers.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 499 n.3.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 502.
59 Booth, 482 U.S. at 503–04.
60 Id. at 503.
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“[w]hile the full range of foreseeable consequences of a defen-
dant’s actions may be relevant in other . . . contexts, we cannot
agree that it is relevant in the unique circumstance of a capital sen-
tencing hearing.”61  To support this assertion, Powell pointed out
that some victims might be capable of making impassioned state-
ments articulating their grief.  On the other hand, some victims
might not leave family members to testify on their behalf, or they
might be “less articulate in describing their feelings even though
their sense of loss is equally severe.”62 Powell further reasoned that
it would be as inappropriate for a jury’s decision to impose the
death penalty to turn on this distinction, as it would be to permit
evidence of the victim’s character.  Such a consideration is not a
“principled way to distinguish [cases] in which the death penalty
was imposed from the many cases in which it was not.”63
Further, the Court noted that if a victim impact statement is
allowed in a capital sentencing hearing it is difficult—“if not im-
possible”—to rebut.64  The problem of rebuttal is two-fold.  First,
there is a strategic problem for the defendant, since on cross-exam-
ination a defendant cannot easily show that “family members exag-
gerated their sleeplessness, depression or emotional trauma
suffered.”65  Second, if victim impact statements are admitted, then
it is presumed the defendant can cross-examine the declarant.66
However, this presentation and rebuttal of evidence creates a
“mini-trial” on the victim’s character.67  Besides being unappeal-
ing,68 this mini-trial detracts from the jury’s charge to consider the
character of the defendant and circumstances of the offense.69
The Court also addressed a foreseeability issue. The state ad-
vanced the argument that a defendant takes the victim as he finds
him and that generally defendants are liable for unforeseen conse-
quences of their actions.  While case law shows that most defend-
ants do not choose their victims based on the effect that the
murder will have on anyone other than victim, Powell did concede
61 Id. at 504.
62 Id. at 505.




67 Id. at 507.
68 Vivian Berger has said that rebutting the statement by impugning the victim’s
character would only be appealing to “Charles Bronson or Clint Eastwood.”  Vivian
Berger, Payne and Suffering-A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 21, 51 (1992).
69 Booth, 482 U.S. at 507.
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that in some cases the defendant could have known some of the
information contained in a victim impact statement before com-
mission of the offense.70  Still, because of the prejudicial nature of
the information contained in the victim impact statement, the
Court held that there is an impermissible risk that the capital sen-
tencing decision will be made in an arbitrary manner.71
Booth was a five–four decision with Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joining Powell’s majority.  However, both
Justices White and Scalia filed dissenting opinions, each joined by
the other.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor joined
both dissents.  These dissents illustrated the controversial nature of
the issue and paved the way for the Payne decision.
White’s dissent presented two arguments in favor of uphold-
ing the Maryland statute.  The first argument is one of straightfor-
ward deference to the legislature.72  White’s second argument was
that culpability and punishment is determined in large part by the
extent of harm caused.73  White essentially argued that some lives
are more valuable than others.74  Additionally, White addressed the
majority’s concern about a jury’s potential arbitrary decision mak-
ing.  He retorted with a two-wrongs-make-a-right argument and
listed the ways that a criminal prosecution is already arbitrary.75
Justice Antonin Scalia used a different framework to address
many of the same points as White.  Scalia drew a distinction be-
tween “moral blameworthiness” and “personal responsibility.”76
70 Id. at 504 (citing to People v. Levitt, 156 Cal.App.3d 500, 516–17 (Cal. 1984)).
71 Booth, 482 U.S. at 505.
72 Id. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
73 In this argument White analogizes to a reckless driving case by saying that a
person who runs a red light should be punished more lightly than a person who runs
a red light and kills a pedestrian. Id. at 516–17 (White, J., dissenting).
74 White does this by pointing to the constitutionality of death penalty statutes
qualifying defendants who are accused of police killings (MD. ANN.CODE art. 27
§ 413(d)(1) (1982)) or assassination of the President or Vice President (18 U.S.C.
§ 1751(a) (1982)). Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting).
75 White writes, “No two prosecutors have exactly the same ability to present their
arguments to the jury; no two witnesses have exactly the same ability to communicate
the facts; but there is no requirement in capital cases that the evidence and argument
be reduced to the lowest common denominator.” Id. at 517–18.
76 Scalia used three examples to illustrate these two categories.  First, a reckless
driving case where nobody is injured versus one where a person is killed.  Second, a
bank-robber who fires and kills his target versus a bank-robber whose gun misfires.
Third, the then recently decided Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), where the
Court upheld the death sentence for two non-triggermen involved in a murder.
Scalia argues that in each case the blameworthiness of the defendant is the same, but
because the result is different the personal responsibility of each is different and
therefore each defendant is deserving of a different sentence. Booth, 482 U.S. at
519–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Citing examples,77 Scalia concluded that although the “moral
blameworthiness” of a defendant may be the same regardless of the
unintended result of his or her actions, “personal responsibility” is
measured by the result.  He argued that the majority improperly
determined the sentence based on blameworthiness alone and that
responsibility should be considered as well.  Although artfully writ-
ten, Scalia’s point is quite similar to White’s: both argued that soci-
ety should value some lives more than others and that a
defendant’s sentence should be determined by the availability and
articulateness of the victim’s family.
Scalia couched his argument in textualist terms stating, “[i]n
sum, the principle upon which the Court’s opinion rests—that the
imposition of capital punishment is to be determined solely on the
basis of moral guilt—does not exist, neither in the text of the Con-
stitution, nor even the opinions of this Court.”  Unlike White,
Scalia did not address the arbitrariness concern on which the
Court’s opinion truly rests.78
B. South Carolina v. Gathers
The Booth rule prohibited family members of a murder victim
from giving a victim impact statement at a capital sentencing hear-
ing.  This rule left unaddressed the question of whether a prosecu-
tor could read a statement about the victim into evidence—that is
until Demetrius Gathers was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death for a park-bench assault on Richard Haynes.79  Mr. Haynes
77 See Booth, 482 U.S. at 516–17 (White, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia does not recognize that the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence provides protections against arbitrary decision making in capital sentencing.
He has written:
Today a petitioner before this Court says that a state sentencing court
(1) had unconstitutionally broad discretion to sentence him to death in-
stead of imprisonment, and (2) had unconstitutionally narrow discretion
to sentence him to imprisonment instead of death. An observer unac-
quainted with our death penalty jurisprudence (and in the habit of
thinking logically) would probably say these positions cannot both be
right . . . .  In my view, it is time for us to reexamine our efforts in this
area and to measure them against the text of the constitutional provi-
sion on which they are purportedly based . . . .  Our decision in Furman,
408 U.S. at 238, was arguably supported by this text.
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656–670 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).  In Payne,
Justice Scalia cites to his Walton line and elaborates, “I have previously expressed my
belief that the latter requirement is both wrong, and when combined with the remain-
der of our capital sentencing jurisprudence, unworkable. Payne, 501 U.S. at 833
(Scalia, J., concurring).
79 South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 806 (1989).
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was 31 years old, mentally ill, unemployed, and transient.80  At the
time of his death, Mr. Haynes was carrying several bags containing
articles of religious significance, including a copy of the “Game
Guy’s Prayer,” which was read into evidence by the prosecution.
These articles were found strewn around the murder scene.81
At the sentencing phase of Mr. Gathers’s trial, the prosecution
readmitted all evidence from the guilt phase including the relig-
ious items possessed by Mr. Haynes82; no additional evidence was
admitted.83  However, the prosecutor did offer a closing argument
that focused extensively on Mr. Haynes’s personal traits.  The ad-
missibility of this testimony was the issue addressed in Gathers.84
The Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that the
prosecution’s closing argument suggested to the jury that “the ap-
pellant deserved a death sentence because the victim was a relig-
ious man and registered voter” but that these characteristics “were
unnecessary to an understanding of the circumstances of the
crime.”85  The state court reversed Gathers’s death sentence and
remanded for a new sentencing proceeding.86
In a decision written by Justice Brennan, the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed this ruling87 and noted, “[o]ur capital cases have
consistently recognized that ‘[f]or purposes of imposing the death
penalty . . . [the defendant’s] punishment must be tailored to his
personal responsibility and moral guilt’ ”88 and “[t]he heart of the
retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly
related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.”89  At
the heart of the plurality’s reasoning was a reaffirmation of the
then recent Booth decision.  Citing Booth, the plurality found the
prosecutor’s statement in Gathers “wholly unrelated to the blame-
worthiness of a particular defendant.”90
In Gathers, Justice Brennan noted that Booth left open the pos-
sibility that victim impact statements may be admissible if “re-
80 Id. at 807.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 808.
83 The religious objects were admitted into evidence through the testimony of a
Charleston police officer. Id. at 807.
84 Id. at 808–09.
85 State v. Gathers, 295 S.C. 476, 484 (S.C. 1988), aff’d.
86 Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810; Gathers, 295 S.C. at 478.
87 Gathers at 812.
88 Id. at 810 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
89 Id. at 810 (quoting Tison, 481 U.S. at 149)(internal quotations omitted).
90 Id. at 810 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 504).
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late[d] directly to the circumstances of the crime.”91  South
Carolina raised this issue in their argument, stating that various
personal items found at the crime scene, “maliciously strewn
around [the victim’s] body during the event,” were “relevant to the
circumstances of the crime.”92  The Gathers Court rejected this ar-
gument, closing this possible method for admission of victim im-
pact statements.
In holding that the evidence was not relevant to “circum-
stances of the crime,” the majority, as the Court had done in Booth,
addressed the issue of foreseeability.  Brennan reasoned that the
fact Gathers rifled through Haynes’s personal belongings for some-
thing to steal was indeed relevant as a “circumstance of the
crime.”93  However, the content of the belongings, as it may have
related to the victim’s character, was inadmissible because there
was “no evidence whatever that showed that the defendant read
anything that was printed.”94
Justice White, a dissenter in Booth, filed a brief concurrence.
He acquiesced in the decision as respect for precedent.95 This con-
currence is curious in light of White’s choice to join the majority in
Payne, which determined that the Eighth Amendment does not per
se prohibit a capital sentencing jury from considering victim im-
pact evidence.96
Justice O’Connor’s dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Kennedy, alluded to the fact she thought Booth was
wrongly decided and should be overruled.  Her dissent rested on
the idea that the case at bar was easy to distinguish from Booth.97  In
Booth the central holding proscribed statements about harm to the
victim’s family; in Gathers, O’Connor wrote, “[a]t issue here are
solely prosecutorial comments about the victim himself.”98
O’Connor is misplaced in resting her dissent on this distinction,
91 Id. at 811 (citing Booth, 482 U.S. at 507).
92 Brief for Petitioner at 28, South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 805 (1989)
(No. 88-305).
93 Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811.
94 Id.  The prosecutor referred to the victim’s prayer card and voter registration
card during closing arguments.  Both items were found among the victim’s belong-
ings scattered around his body, and were admitted into evidence.  The prosecutor
“conveyed the suggestion appellant deserved a death sentence because the victim was
a religious man and a registered voter.” Gathers, 490 U.S at 810 (quoting Gathers, 295
S.C. at 484).
95 Id. at 812 (White, J., concurring) (writing that “[u]nless Booth v. Maryland . . . is
to be overruled, the judgment below must be affirmed.”).
96 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); see infra Part II.C.
97 Id. at 813–14 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 814 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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because, in fact, Booth deals quite directly with evidence of the vic-
tims themselves.99
O’Connor first restated the facts of the case in a gruesome
manner100 and went on to ground the remainder of her dissent on
two intertwined concepts.  First, sentencing should be based on
moral blameworthiness.101  Second, capital sentencing should not
be one-sided.  O’Connor argued that the Lockett and Eddings line of
cases, which establish a requirement for individualized sentencing
based on the defendant’s character and circumstances of the of-
fense, should be balanced by victim impact evidence.102  These ar-
guments laid out some of the underlying rationale for the Payne
decision.103
Justice Scalia filed a separate, solo dissent in which he minced
no words and made no attempt to distinguish this case from Booth.
Instead, he argued Booth was wrongly decided and should be
overturned.104
Despite the “spirited” dissents, in practical terms, the Gathers
rule simply extended the Booth ban on victim impact statements
made by family members of the victim to also include statements
made by a prosecutor. This is particularly helpful in the analysis of
Payne because there the Supreme Court deemed the prosecutor’s
statements about the victims constitutionally permissible.
C. Payne v. Tennessee
Pervis Payne was convicted by a Tennessee jury of the first-de-
gree murders of Charisse Christopher and her daughter Lacie, and
of the assault of Charisse’s son Nicholas.  Mr. Payne was sentenced
to death for the two murders and to thirty years in prison for the
assault.105
Payne’s death sentence rested largely on the penalty phase tes-
timony of Charisse’s mother and the prosecutor’s inflammatory
and illegal closing argument.  Nicholas’s grandmother testified
99 Id.; Booth, 482 U.S. at 499–500.
100 Gathers, 490 U.S. at 814–16 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 818.
102 Id. at 817 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604).
103 O’Connor relies on the recent dissents written by herself or her fellow dissent-
ers. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 398 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); En-
mund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 823 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  The personnel
of the Court had changed by the time the issue is revisited in Payne and these dissents
become the basis of the majority opinion. Payne v. Tennesse, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
104 Gathers, 490 U.S. at 823 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105 Payne, 501 U.S. at 811.
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that “[h]e cries for his mom . . . [and] [h]e doesn’t seem to under-
stand why she doesn’t come home.”106  The prosecutor’s closing
argument focused largely on the impact on Nicholas and his fam-
ily.107  The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the conviction
and sentence, and rejected Payne’s argument that the admission of
the grandmother’s testimony and the prosecutor’s closing argu-
ment violated the Eighth Amendment as applied in Booth and Gath-
ers.108  That court reasoned that although the testimony of the
grandmother was “technically irrelevant” it “did not create a consti-
tutionally unacceptable risk of an arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty . . . .”109  The United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari “to reconsider our holdings in Booth and Gathers that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits a capital sentencing jury from con-
sidering ‘victim impact’ evidence relating to the personal charac-
teristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crimes on
the victim’s family.”110
In writing Payne’s six-member majority opinion, Rehnquist be-
gan the analysis by laying a favorable foundation from which to
work.  Arguably, he over-simplified the Booth/Gathers rule by fram-
ing it using two premises: first, evidence relating to a particular
victim or harm caused to the victim’s family does not reflect on the
defendant’s blameworthiness, and second, only evidence relevant
to a defendant’s “blameworthiness” is relevant to capital sentenc-
ing.111  The next portion of his opinion gives historical context for
“the principles which have guided criminal sentencing—as op-
posed to criminal liability . . . .”112  In this section, Rehnquist built
the retributive framework on which the rest of the opinion hangs.
Just as O’Connor reasoned in her Gathers dissent,113 Rehnquist
concluded that victim impact evidence provides the State with a
logical answer to mitigation.114  He argued that the precedent on
106 Id. at 814.
107 Id. at 814–15.
108 State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 17 (Tenn. 1990).
109 Id. at 18.
110 Payne, 501 U.S. at 817.
111 Id. at 819.
112 Id.
In this portion of the argument Chief Justice Rehnquist cites to the book of Exo-
dus, “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”  Notably missing is a citation to Matthew
that states “[a]n eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.  But I say unto you, That ye resist
not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other
also.” 5 Matthew 38:39 (King James).
113 Gathers, 490 U.S. at 817 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
114 Payne, 501 U.S. at 839.
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which Booth partially relies115 was misread as only describing a class
of evidence that could be introduced in favor of a defendant.116
Rehnquist wrote that the allegedly misread precedent “unfairly
weighted the scales in a capital trial; while virtually no limits are
placed on mitigating evidence, . . . the State is barred from either
offering ‘a quick glimpse into the life’ [of the victim], or demon-
strating the loss to the victim’s family.”117  Rehnquist borrowed the
language for this reasoning from his dissent in Mills; the same dis-
sent O’Connor cited to in her Booth dissent.
Rehnquist went on to address the Booth reasoning that victim
impact evidence must be excluded because it creates a “mini-trial
on the victim’s character”118 and is impossible to rebut.119  Rehn-
quist was not concerned with either the defendant’s Hobbesian
choice on how to rebut a victim impact statement or the specific
relevancy requirements of capital sentencing.120  Rather, he
glossed over these concerns, instead giving voice to the concept
that “relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admitted and its
weight left to the fact finder.”121
Because Booth was so recently decided, and even more recently
extended by Gathers, the rumblings of stare decisis were obvious.
Rehnquist tried to address the concern by giving an extensive list
of cases where the Court has overturned precedent.122  Cases
where stare decisis is most important, Rehnquist argued, arise in
the contract law context where reliance is at issue.123
Federalist themes echo throughout the opinion.  Rehnquist
wrote, “[u]nder our constitutional system, the primary responsibil-
115 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 104; Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
O’Connor specifically addresses the Woodson language that the capital defendant
must be treated as a “uniquely individual human being.” Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
116 See Steven Paul Smith, Unreliable and Prejudicial: The Use of Extraneous Unadjudi-
cated Offenses in the Penalty Phase of Capital Trials, 93 COL. L. REV. 1249, 1256 (1993)
(noting the Court is moving away from the Lockett/Edding line of cases, in favor of a
broader interpretation of the “individualized sentencing” mandate).
117 Payne, 501 U.S. at 822.
118 Id. at 823 (citing Booth, 482 U.S. at 506–507).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983)).
122 Id. at 827–828.
123 Id. at 828.  For this proposition Rehnquist cites to a number of Supreme Court
precedents including: Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); Or. ex rel.
State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); The Genesee
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 458 (1852).
Rehnquist goes on to write, “the opposite is true in cases such as the present one
involving procedural and evidentiary rules.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 828.  He fails to but-
tress this assertion with a single citation.
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ity for defining crimes, . . .  fixing punishments, . . .  and establish-
ing procedures for criminal trials rests with the States . . . subject to
the overriding provisions of the United States Constitution.”124
Those considerations led the majority to the ultimate holding, “if
the State chooses to permit victim impact evidence and
prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment
erects no per se bar.”125
The Payne decision stopped short in three areas.  First and
most obviously, it does not create a constitutional right for victims.
It merely allows states to enact victim impact statutes and apply
them in the capital sentencing context rather than mandating that
states do so.  Second, it explicitly limits the holding to the overrul-
ing of Booth and Gathers only in regards to their ban on information
relating to the victim and impact on his family.126  In Booth, evi-
dence of a victim’s family members’ characterizations and opinions
about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence was
held inadmissible.  In Payne, no such evidence was at issue.  There-
fore, that portion of Booth remains intact.  Third, Rehnquist recog-
nized the possibility that evidence may be “introduced that is so
unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally un-
fair,”127 however a prejudiced party should seek remedy through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.128
Justice O’Connor wrote a two-part concurring opinion joined
by Justices White and Kennedy.  In the first part, O’Connor
stressed the federalism implications.  States can “choose” not to
have victim impact statements in capital sentencing.129  Further,
even if a victim impact statement is unduly inflammatory, there are
procedural protections in place.  She argued that a defendant can
seek refuge in the Fourteenth Amendment and the appellate
courts.130  In the second part, O’Connor specifically addressed Jus-
tice Marshall’s dissent.  She asserted, “I do not think it fair . . .
124 Id. at 824.
125 Id. at 827.
126 Id. at 830 n.2.
127 Id. at 824.
128 Id. at 825.
129 Id. at 830–31.
130 Id.  The potential of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for such
relief has been unrealized in the years since Payne.  Justin D. Flamm, Due Process on the
“Uncharted Seas of Irrelevance:” Limiting the Presence of Victim Impact Evidence at Capital
Sentencing After Payne v. Tennessee, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 295 (1999).  Likewise
O’Connor’s faith in the appellate courts may be misplaced, especially because the
Tennessee Supreme Court failed to see the evidence at issue in Payne as a violation of
then existing federal law.
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[that] plainly inadequate rational support must be left in place for
the sole reason that it once attracted five votes.”131
The issue of foreseeability was addressed in a separate concur-
ring opinion by Justice Souter joined by Justice Kennedy.  Souter
wrote, “[e]very defendant knows, if endowed with the mental com-
petence for criminal responsibility, that the life he will take by his
homicidal behavior is that of a unique person, like himself, and
that person to be killed probably has close associates, ‘survivors,’
who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim’s death.”132
Souter went on to state that the purpose of his separate concur-
rence is his particular displeasure with Booth’s “unworkable stan-
dard of constitutional relevance.”133  To illustrate the point he
grounded his defense for overturning precedent in a separate body
of case law from the majority.134
Two separate dissents were filed that both warned of the po-
tential danger of the majority’s precedent and exposed the faulty
reasoning behind their opinion.  The first, by Justice Marshall and
joined by Justice Blackmun, is vitriolic and personal.  It starts,
“Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court’s decision
making.”135  The essence of his dissent is that, because of a person-
nel change, the Court “declares itself free to discard any concept of
constitutional liberty”136 and create an exception to the general
rule of stare decisis.  Marshall concluded by cautioning against cre-
ating a slippery slope.  He warned, “Cast aside today are those con-
demned to face society’s ultimate penalty.  Tomorrow’s victims may
be minorities, women, or the indigent.”137  On June 27, 1991, Mar-
shall resigned his tenure at the Supreme Court—two short hours
after reading this dissent from the bench.138
Justice Stevens’s dissent, also joined by Blackmun, seconded
Marshall’s concerns, but went on to systematically dissect the ma-
jority’s reasoning.  The opening paragraphs of this dissent draw the
reader in by creating a counter-factual example to the type of evi-
131 Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 838 (Souter, J., concurring).
133 Id. at 839 (Souter, J., concurring).
134 Id. at 842–43 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168, 178–83 (1986), which is used by Souter to suggest that refuge from prejudicial
victim impact statements can be sought in the Due Process clause).
135 Id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 845 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
137 Id. 856 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138 Randall Coyne, Taking the Death Penalty Personally: Justice Thurgood Marshall, 47
OKLA. L. REV. 35, 54 (1994).
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dence the majority foresees coming in under the new Payne rule.
Justice Stevens wrote:
If a defendant, who had murdered a convenience store clerk in
cold blood . . . offered evidence . . . about the immoral character
of his victim, all would recognize immediately that the evidence
was irrelevant and inadmissible.  Evenhanded justice requires
the same constraint be imposed on the advocate of the death
penalty.139
Stevens saw the majority’s argument, that victim impact evidence
offers the prosecution an answer to mitigating character evidence
of the defendant, as a non sequitar because “the victim is not on
trial.”140  Stevens further argued that victim impact evidence allows
for arbitrary, inconsistent sentencing141 and presents a defendant
with an impossible tactical decision on how to rebut.142
III. HOW THE JURISDICTIONS TREAT PAYNE
As of this article, twenty states do not allow any victim impact
evidence in capital sentencing.143  In his 2003 retrospective of post-
Payne jurisprudence, John H. Blume observed that thirty-three of
the thirty-eight death penalty states, as well as the federal govern-
ment and the military, allow some type of victim impact evidence
in capital sentencing.144
What constitutes victim impact evidence varies between juris-
dictions because Payne does not mandate that states adopt victim
impact statutes, nor does it provide guidance to the type of statutes
139 Payne, 501 U.S. at 857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 860–61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 864 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143 The Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to comport with an “evolving
standard of decency.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).  This evolving standard
has been quantified by certain objective measurements. Typically, this includes a
count of the jurisdictions that subscribe to a certain practice, such as executing
juveniles, and those that do not.  When calculating which jurisdictions do not partici-
pate in the practice the United States Supreme Court will include jurisdictions which
have no death penalty into their count. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 552–53 (held un-
constitutional the execution of persons under the age of 18, noting that “30 states
prohibit the juvenile death penalty altogether, comprising 12 that have rejected the
death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it . . . but exclude juveniles from its
reach.”); Tison, 48 U.S. at 175 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Thus it appears that
about three-fifths of the States and the District of Columbia have rejected the position
[that non-triggerman convicted of felony murder in certain circumstances can face
the death penalty] the Court adopts today.”).
144 John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 257, 267–268 (2003).
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states should adopt.145 Payne merely states, “the Eighth Amend-
ment erects no per se bar [to victim impact statements].”146  There-
fore, state legislatures and courts have shaped the type and extent
of victim impact evidence.
Professor Blume grouped states with active death penalty stat-
utes into three categories of victim impact evidence admissibility:
undecided, limited admissibility, and admissible.147  Professor
Blume’s categories, although straightforward, must be redefined
slightly to comport with changes in the law.148  Since his article,
145 Professor Blume states in his 2003 article that “thirty-three of the thirty-eight
states with the death penalty, as well as the federal government and the military, cur-
rently allow the use of VIE in capital trials.” Id. at 267. Following are examples of how
different jurisdictions that allow victim impact evidence in capital sentencing hearings
treat such admissions post-Payne.
Arizona: State v. Garza, 163 P.3d 1006, 1019 (Ariz. 2007) (discussing how ARI-
ZONA RULE CRIM. PRO. 19.1(d) expressly allows victim impact statements after opening
statements and before the defense’s mitigation evidence and is thus not unduly preju-
dicial for the victim’s mother to compare her loss to the September 11th terrorist
attacks).
Florida: Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 97 (Fla. 2007) (holding that the testi-
mony of the victim’s family and coworker about his military service was within the
bounds of victim impact evidence as provided in both FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(7)
and Payne).
Maryland: Williams v. State, 679 A.2d 1106, 1127 (Md. 1996) (interpreting MD.
CODE ANN., art. 41, § 4-609(d) (1993) to limit the use of written victim impact state-
ments in death penalty cases to those statements made in a pre-sentence investigation,
and ruling the statement at issue inadmissible because it was not made in such an
investigation).
Oklahoma: Williams v. State, 22 P.3d 702, 718 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (holding
that victim impact statements are admissible pursuant to OKLA. STAT. ANN. 22 § 984
and precedent, but are limited to “financial, emotional, psychological, and physical
effects” on the victim’s survivors).
Military: U.S. v. Loving, 41 M.J. 213, 258-259 (C.A.A.F. 1994) (holding that it was
not an abuse of discretion to allow testimony of a victim’s wife).
146 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
147 Blume, supra note 144, at 268.
148 Since Professor Blume’s article, the national death penalty climate has changed.
When he wrote his article thirty-eight states had active death penalty statutes.  Now
only thirty-six states do.  New Jersey passed legislation which replaced the death pen-
alty with life imprisonment without parole.  Governor Jon Corzine commuted all
eight death row inmates’ sentences to life without parole.  Jeremy W. Peters, Corzine
Signs Bill Ending Executions, Then Commutes Sentences of 8, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at
B3.  Also, New York’s Court of Appeals held that the death penalty statute’s jury dead-
lock instruction violated the state constitution’s procedural due process provision and
the only admissible remedy was legislative.  People v. Lavalle, 3 N.Y.3d 88 (2004).  The
legislature chose not to amend the statute and restore the death penalty.  The Court
of Appeals affirmed Lavalle, reversing the final death sentence on October 23, 2007.
People v. Taylor, 848 N.Y.S.2d 554 (2007).
Further, many states have non-legislative moratoria on the death penalty, pre-
scribed either through executive or judicial means.  Illinois continues a governor-im-
posed moratoria on executions, although state prosecutors still bring capital charges.
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New Jersey, a state with an interesting treatment of the issue,149 has
abolished its death penalty statute.150  Wyoming has deemed victim
impact evidence inadmissible.151  Further, the treatment of victim
impact evidence by certain states defies tidy classification and
therefore should be explored in greater detail.
Only two states, New Hampshire152 and Connecticut,153 have
active death penalty statutes and statutory provisions allowing vic-
tim impact evidence, yet have not determined whether such evi-
dence can be used in capital sentencing.  Montana case law clearly
admits non-testimonial victim impact evidence, but it is unclear
whether live victim impact testimony is admissible.154  Indiana and
Mississippi continue their significant limitations on admissibility.155
Monica Davey, Illinois Governor in the Middle of New Death Penalty Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2004; Illinois Coalition to Abolish The Death Penalty, 2008 Annual Report,
http://www.icadp.org/ICADPannualreport08.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).  Simi-
larly, a de facto moratorium on lethal injections nation-wide was halted when the
Supreme Court held such executions were not a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Baze v. Rees, 128 S.Ct. 1520 (2008).
149 Until New Jersey abolished the death penalty, it stood alone as the only state
among the jurisdictions that permit victim impact evidence.  There, the admission of
victim impact testimony is permitted only in those cases in which the defendant places
his character or record at issue as a mitigating circumstance.  State v. Muhammad,
678 A.2d 164, 168 (N.J. 1996).
150 See Peters, supra note 148.
151 Olsen v. Wyoming, 67 P.3d 536, 594 (Wyo. 2003) (held existing Wyoming law
does not permit victim impact evidence in capital sentencing).
152 See infra note 201.
153 Connecticut has yet to address the issue directly.  However, a statute, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46d (2008), permitting victim impact statements in capital sen-
tencing hearings was adopted subsequent to a 2003 trial, no capital statutes have been
conducted since its adoption.  As such the issue under Connecticut state law, remains
open.  State v. Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363, 415 n.44 (Conn. 2003).
154 In Kills On Top v. State, 15 P.3d 422, 438 (Mont. 2000), the Montana Supreme
Court noted that they had previously admitted non-testimonial victim impact evi-
dence.  The court also noted that Payne expressly overrules Booth. Id.  It seems that
the latter language is an invitation to expand the Montana rule to include testimonial
victim impact evidence as well.
155 In Indiana and Mississippi, both “weighing” states where non-statutory aggravat-
ing factors are not considered, victim impact evidence is limited to proving the exis-
tence of statutorily enumerated aggravating factors.  The Indiana Supreme Court
wrote, “[w]ith our determination today that Indiana’s statutory death penalty ag-
gravators are the only aggravating circumstances available, the admissibility of the vic-
tim impact evidence in the present case hinges upon its relevance to the death
penalty statute’s aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”  Bivins v. State, 642
N.E.2d 928, 957 (Ind. 1994). Mississippi capital jurisprudence has a history of ques-
tioning the scope of Payne. See Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1171, 1183 (Miss. 1992);
Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 146–147 (Miss. 1991).  In one decision the Mississippi
Supreme Court recognized “[t]his Court, however, has been hesitant to embrace the
full constitutional panoply afforded by Payne.”  Berry v. State, 703 So. 2d 269, 275
(Miss. 1997).  The Court went on to say that victim impact evidence could only be
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This section of the paper will first provide a brief overview of
victim impact evidence.  Second, it will discuss the many jurisdic-
tions that allow victim impact statements.  Third, it will discuss the
few jurisdictions that, while retaining the death penalty, have
barred or significantly limited the admission of victim impact state-
ments.  Last, this section will explore the two remaining death pen-
alty jurisdictions to rule on the issue.
A. What is Included in the Term “Victim Impact Evidence”?
The type of victim impact evidence permitted varies across ju-
risdictions.  Because Payne clearly invited states to allow evidence
related to the victim’s personal characteristics and the emotional
impact of the murder on family members,156 evidence about the
victim’s good character is probably the most common.157  Also
common is evidence of the victim’s talents,158 intelligence,159 spiri-
tuality, work ethic, educational background, and standing in the
community.160  Similarly, jurisdictions differ in their approach to
the permissibility of evidence that the defendant’s conduct nega-
tively impacted the law enforcement community.161
Murder victims’ family members have been allowed to testify
about a wide range of effects including miscarriages, heart attacks,
used to establish an existing aggravating factor listed in the capital sentencing statute,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5) (1994). Berry, 703 So. 2d. at 275– 276.
156 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
157 See, e.g., Roberts v. Bowersox, 61 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (held that
victim impact evidence, including witnesses’ testimony about the victim’s kindness
and their close friendship with her, did not improperly or unconstitutionally influ-
ence the jury’s sentencing determination); Raulerson v. State, 491 S.E.2d 791 (Ga.
1997) (holding admissible testimony read by the prosecutor, including testimony
from the first victim’s father that, at the time of his death, the victim attended college
and planned to marry the second victim; a statement from the second victim’s father
that she was a senior honor student in high school who planned to marry the first
victim; and testimony by the third victim’s son that she was a nurse and the divorced
mother of two children); State v. Reeves, 448 S.E.2d 802 (N.C. 1994) (holding admis-
sible testimony that the victim was a very good person, that she always went to church,
that she was a good wife and mother, would do anything for anyone, and died not
knowing what happened to her daughter).  Blume, supra note 144, at 269.
158 See Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 250–252 (Md. 1995) (holding evidence
that victim was a highly skilled pianist as relevant).
159 See State v. Frost, 727 So. 2d 417, 431–432 (La. 1998) (holding evidence that the
victim was intelligent as relevant).
160 Blume, supra note 144, at 270.
161 Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199, 213–216 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that the
prosecutor’s comments made during sentencing that the victim was a police officer
was not improper); but see Lambert v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1060, 1062–1065 (Ind. 1996)
(finding error in admission of evidence that since the murder of a police officer the
police chief could no longer do his job).
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and other illnesses and negative effects that they attribute to the
loss.162  This type of evidence was also admitted in the Payne trial
itself.163  Additionally, most states allowing victim impact evidence
place no limits on the number of witnesses that may testify.164
A new variety of victim impact evidence, seemingly not con-
templated at the time of the Payne decision, is now finding its way
into capital sentencing hearings.  This includes archived video
footage of statements made by the deceased instead of their fam-
ily.165  This type of evidence was admitted against Ronell Wilson,166
the only federal defendant to be sentenced to death by a New York
jury.167
Many courts operating with loose restrictions on victim impact
evidence reason along the lines of Scalia’s concurrence in Payne
and hold that victim impact evidence provides an answer to Lock-
ett’s requirement for mitigating evidence.168  Still, this reasoning
flies in the face of established case law because the “all relevant
evidence” language should speak only to mitigation.  As Justice Ste-
vens asserted, “ ‘[v]ictim impact’ evidence was still unheard of
when Lockett was decided.”169
162 Blume, supra note 144, at 270.
163 Payne, 501 U.S. at 814.
164 See Blume, supra note 144, at 270.
165 U.S. v. Wilson, 493 F.Supp.2d 491, 505–506 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that a
video depicting the murdered police officer describing his job was admissible); Whit-
tlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 230 (Md. 1995) (holding admissible a 90 second video
clip of the deceased playing the piano, a skill for which he was nationally recognized);
State v. Allen, 994 P.2d 728, 751 (N.M. 1999) (holding admissible a three minute
videotape of the deceased on a camping trip); compare with U.S. v. Sampson, 335
F.Supp.2d 166 (D.Mass. 2004) (holding a 27 minute video of victim made for a me-
morial service, featuring over 200 still photographs of the victim, and set to music, as
inadmissible because its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice and created a danger of provoking undue sympathy and a verdict based on
passion as opposed to reason); United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1221 n. 47
(10th Cir.1998) (holding wedding photographs and home videos as inadmissible).
166 Judge Garaufis engaged in a FED. R. EVID. 403 styled balancing test before ad-
mitting the video of the murder victim. Wilson, 493 F. Supp.2d at 505.  Judge Garaufis
also attempted to limit the prejudicial effect of the victim impact evidence by in-
structing the jurors that they should not permit the testimony of such witnesses to
overwhelm their ability to follow the law. Id. at 505–506.  The effectiveness of such an
instruction is questionable.
167 Anthony M. Destefano, Judge: Death penalty in drug case not worth pursuing, NEWS-
DAY, Mar. 1, 2008; see also Alan Feuer, An Aversion to the Death Penalty, but No Shortage of
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, at B1.
168 For example, Pennsylvania has reasoned that state law favors the introduction of
“all relevant” evidence at capital sentencing.  Pennsylvania v. Means, 773 A.2d 143,
153 (Pa. 2001).
169 Payne, 501 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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B. Two Approaches
1. Jurisdictions Embracing Payne
Thirty states make victim impact evidence more or less admis-
sible.170  The federal and military systems also allow victim impact
evidence with few restrictions.171
Prior to legislation, courts in two of these states, Oregon and
Utah, had found that victim impact statements were inadmissible,
reasoning that they are not relevant to any issue under their capital
sentencing statutes.172  In State v. Guzek the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon reasoned that victim impact evidence, while tending to prove
the fact at which it was directed, was immaterial to the special ques-
tions directed to the jury.173  The Oregon legislature amended
their death penalty statute to explicitly mention victim impact evi-
dence.174  Such evidence was later held admissible.175  In State v.
Carter, the Supreme Court of Utah held victim impact evidence was
not relevant to the sentence and lacked probative force, and there-
fore was inadmissible.176  The Utah legislature later amended the
death penalty statute to permit such evidence, if it is presented
without comparison to other victims.177  Although both Oregon
and Utah can now technically be included in the list of states where
170 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington. See Blume, supra
note 144.
171 Id.
172 State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 651 (Utah 1995) (held that a victim impact state-
ment was irrelevant to sentencing and lacked probative force pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-3-207(2) (West 2007)); State v. Guzek, 906 P.2d 272 (Or. 1995) (rejected a
victim impact statement, similar to that introduced in Payne, on relevancy grounds).
173 Guzek, 906 P.2d at 284.  Oregon’s capital statute is different from the majority
states’ because it does not have listed aggravating and mitigating factors.  It puts ques-
tions to the jury where aggravation and mitigation should be considered. See infra
note 172.
174 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.150(1)(a) (West 2007) reads:
In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the
court deems relevant to sentence including, but not limited to, victim
impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim or
the impact of the crime on the victim’s family and any aggravating or
mitigating evidence relevant to the issue in paragraph (b)(D) of this
subsection.
Id.
175 State v. Hayward, 963 P.2d 667 (Or. 1998).
176 Carter, 88 P.2d at 651 (1995) (noting that although the Rules of Evidence are
not binding in Utah capital sentencing, they still provide guidance).
177 UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 76-3-207(2)(1)(iii) (West 2007) (“In capital sentencing
proceedings, evidence may be presented on: . . . the victim and the impact of the
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victim impact statements are admissible, their unique history is
worth noting for the struggle between courts that find victim im-
pact evidence irrelevant to capital sentencing and legislatures that
are driven to render such evidence admissible.
2. Jurisdictions Limiting or Rejecting Payne
Payne merely states that the Eighth Amendment erects no per
se bar to victim impact evidence.178  It does not create a constitu-
tional right for victims.  Therefore, states are permitted to place
limits on the use of victim impact statements.  States that reject the
logic of Payne often determine that victim impact evidence is irrele-
vant to capital sentencing and creates the risk of a fact-finder ren-
dering an arbitrary decision with life or death consequences for
the defendant.
Indiana and Mississippi have significant limitations on victim
impact statements at capital sentencing hearings.179  In Indiana,
the court limits victim impact evidence to that which is relevant to
mitigating and aggravating factors.  Procedurally, a trial court will
grant a motion in limine prior to a sentencing hearing in order to
satisfy this limitation.180 Indiana is distinguished by the fact that it
is a strict “weighing state,” allowing only consideration of enumer-
ated aggravating factors,181 which has the effect of further limiting
victim impact evidence.  Mississippi does not have a per se bar on
victim impact evidence.  It allows only evidence relevant to estab-
lishing an aggravating circumstance.182
Recently, the Supreme Court of Wyoming has gone a step fur-
ther and rejected the underlying basis of Payne.  The Wyoming
high court addressed the power shift on the United States Su-
preme Court.183  In Olsen v. Wyoming, the defendant articulated a
three-fold argument for the preclusion of victim impact state-
ments.  First, Payne is not mandatory. Payne does not require victim
impact statements be admitted; it merely allows them, leaving the
crime on the victim’s family and community without comparison to other persons or
victims.”).
178 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
179 Annual Report of the Illinois Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note
148.
180 Holmes v. State, 671 N.E.2d 841, 848–849 (Ind. 1996); Bivins, 642 N.E.2d 928.
181 Means, 773 A.2d at 154.
182 Berry, 703 at 275.
183 Olsen, 67 P.3d at 594 (holding that existing Wyoming law does not permit victim
impact evidence).  The Wyoming Court wrote, “For example, not all judges agree that
victim impact is relevant to a determination of the sentence in a capital case. Booth
and Payne were not unanimous decisions.” Id. at 598.
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ultimate decision to the state courts.  Second, after Payne, the Wyo-
ming legislature did not amend its death penalty statute to include
a victim impact provision.  Third, the general victim impact statute
that already existed in Wyoming is not applicable to capital sen-
tencing.184  The Court accepted this reasoning, seizing on the fact
that the Wyoming Legislature did not explicitly authorize the ad-
mission of victim impact evidence.185
Unfortunately, as remarkable as the Olsen decision was, an-
other Wyoming case handed down the same day limited its applica-
bility.186  That case held that admission of victim impact statements
was subject to a harmless error review on a case-by-case basis.187
However, Martin J. Olsen did get a new sentencing hearing in
which victim impact evidence was inadmissible.188
There are common themes on how states reign in the scope of
victim impact evidence.  For example, some states limit who may
testify.189  Other states have reversed sentences when the scope of
victim impact statements went too far.190  “Too long and too emo-
tional” seems to be a guiding principle for when victim impact evi-
184 Id. at 594.
185 The Olsen court wrote, “It is interesting that, in the aftermath of Payne, a num-
ber of state legislatures amended their capital sentencing statutes to explicitly author-
ize the admission of victim impact evidence.” Id. at 599.  The Court continued, “In
addition to Pennsylvania and Florida, ten other states revised their death penalty stat-
utes after Payne to provide for consideration of victim impact evidence during capital
sentencing proceedings; Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-602 (Michie Supp.1995); Colo.Rev.Stat.
Ann. § 16-11-103 (West Supp.1996); La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.2 (West
Supp.1997); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.030 (Vernon Supp.1997); Mont.Code Ann. § 46-18-
302 (1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3 (West 1995); Okla.Rev.Stat. § 163.150
(Supp.1996); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-27A-2(2) (Supp.1997); and Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-207 (Supp.1996).” Id. at 599 n.14.
186 Harlow v. Wyoming, 70 P.3d 179 (Wyo. 2003).
187 Id.
188 Olsen, 67 P.3d at 600.
189 See Blume, supra note 144, at 270 n.122.  Idaho allows families of homicide vic-
tims to testify at sentencing hearings.  Idaho Code § 19-5306(3) (Michie 2002).  Simi-
larly, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Hope, 702 N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (Ill. 1998),
limited the meaning of “crime victim” in the Illinois Rights of Crime Victims and
Witnesses Act to a spouse, child, parent, or sibling of the victim. See also CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1191.1 (West 2008) (allowing only “next of kin” to testify, § 1191.1 passed as
Prop 8, “The Victims’ Bill of Rights,” in early 1982).
190 Blume, supra note 144, at 279, n.171; Wimberly v. State, 759 So. 2d 568, 574
(Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (reversing on other grounds but noting “[i]f we were not
already reversing this case for a new trial, we would set aside the sentence and remand
this case to the trial court for a new sentencing phase before the jury and a new
sentencing hearing before the trial court based on . . . admission of improper [victim
impact evidence]”); Clark v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 793, 796–97 (Ky. 1991) (or-
dering new sentencing trial due to improper exploitation of the grief of the victim’s
family); State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d 966, 973 (La. 1992) (remanding the case because
the defendant did not receive a pretrial hearing regarding the admissibility of the
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dence can be precluded where it would be otherwise
permissible.191  Courts and legislatures have imposed similar limita-
tions on victim impact video footage.192  The unifying theme in
these limitations is that the intention of Payne was to provide a
“quick glimpse” into the life of the victim.193  Courts have held that
this “quick glimpse” should indeed be quick.194
Further, victim impact statements from victims of a defen-
dant’s previous crimes are typically inadmissible because they are
irrelevant to the case for which the defendant is standing trial.195
The most important limitation on the scope of victim impact evi-
dence is that a victim’s family members’ characterizations and
opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sen-
tence are inadmissible.  This part of Booth survives in theory and in
practice.196
C. Two Remaining States: A Last Frontier?
New Hampshire and Connecticut are the remaining two states
with active death penalty statutes that have yet to deal with the is-
sue of whether victim impact statements are admissible.  Both
should reject the logic of Payne and follow Wyoming’s example.
The last execution in New Hampshire was in 1939.197  How-
ever, there have been capital prosecutions,198 and the death pen-
alty statute has remained on the books with the last amendment to
the statute occuring in the 1990 legislative session.199  In the last
year, the Attorney General’s Office has announced its intent to
seek the death penalty in two different cases.200
victim impact evidence and more particularized notice of what victim impact evidence
the State intended to introduce at trial).
191 Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 211 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007).
192 See Olsen, 67 P.3d at 594.
193 Payne, 501 U.S. at 822.
194 See Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1236 (10th Cir. 2002) (limiting victim evi-
dence to statements “showing how the victim’s death is affecting or might affect the
victim’s survivors, and why the victim should not have been killed.”).
195 Colorado, Illinois, and Nevada have expressly rejected admission of victim im-
pact statements from victims not named in the indictment.  Blume, supra note 144, at
272.
196 See State v. Lovelace, 90 P.3d 298 (Idaho 2004); State v. Bjorklund, 604 N.W.2d
169 (Neb. 2000).
197 Howard Long of Alton, N.H. was hanged on July 14, 1939.  Kathryn Marchocki,
Addison Pleads Not Guilty, NEW HAMPSHIRE UNION LEADER, Feb. 28, 2007, at A1.
198 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570 (N.H. 1991).
199 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (West 2008) (amended 1990).
200 One prosecution is against Michael Addison, the other John Brooks.  Dan
Gorenstein, Two Very Different Defendants, NEW HAMPSHIRE PUBLIC RADIO, Apr. 10,
2008, http://www.nhpr.org/node/15776 (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
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New Hampshire’s capital sentencing statute enumerates cer-
tain aggravating factors, and other non-statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances can be introduced upon proper notice.  The statute
does not enumerate victim impact evidence.  Therefore, if it is ad-
mitted, it must be as a non-statutory aggravating factor.
Law and logic dictate that New Hampshire should make victim
impact evidence inadmissible.  Similar to Wyoming, the state legis-
lature has not seriously contemplated the use of victim impact
statements in capital sentencing.  The capital statue does not ex-
plicitly mention victim impact evidence, and there is no evidence
that the legislature amended the statutory language of the general
victim impact statute to keep up with modern Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.201
Further, there is an inconsistency between the general victim
impact statute202 and the capital sentencing statute.203  Although
the first sentence of the general victim impact statute includes
“capital murder,” this statute is intended for situations where a
judge is the sentencer.  Constitutional law204 and the capital sen-
201 The last amendment to the New Hampshire victim impact statute was in 1994.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:4-a (West 2008).
202 The general victim impact statute states:
Victims of Certain Violent Crimes Against a Person Permitted to Speak
Before Sentencing and at Sentence Reduction or Suspension Hearings.
Before a judge sentences or suspends or reduces the sentence of any
person for capital, first degree or second degree murder, attempted
murder, manslaughter, aggravated felonious sexual assault, felonious
sexual assault, first degree assault, or negligent homicide committed in
consequence of being under the influence of intoxicating liquor or con-
trolled drugs, the victim of the offense, or the victim’s next of kin if the
victim has died, shall have the opportunity to address the judge. The
victim or victim’s next of kin may appear personally or by counsel and
may reasonably express his views concerning the offense, the person
responsible, and the need for restitution. The prosecutor, the person to
be sentenced, and the attorney for the person to be sentenced shall
have the right to be present when the victim or victim’s next of kin so
addresses the judge. The judge may consider the statements of the vic-
tim or next of kin made pursuant to this section when imposing sen-
tence or making a decision regarding sentence reduction or sentence
suspension.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:4-a.
203 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5; Amy K. Phillips, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People:
The Problem of Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 100
n.56 (“[Section 651:4-a] seems to allow victim impact statements only when a judge is
the sentencer, but [630:5] delegates the capital sentencing task to a jury.”).
204 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002) (holding that capital defendants are
entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions their
maximum punishment).
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tencing statute make clear that a judge cannot be the sentencer.205
In the states that do allow victim impact evidence, the state legisla-
ture has explicitly included it in the death penalty statute or sepa-
rate victim impact statute in which capital punishment is
mentioned.206  Other states will only allow victim impact statements
if they are relevant to a statutory aggravating factor.207  Lastly, the
New Hampshire Constitution has been interpreted to be more pro-
tective of defendants.208
The strength of the argument against victim impact evidence
in a Connecticut capital hearing is, perhaps, weaker than in New
Hampshire.  The capital statute specifically mentions inclusion of
such evidence.209  Nonetheless, for all the reasons stated above,
Payne is still flawed precedent.  Other states have rejected Payne be-
cause victim impact evidence is irrelevant and results in arbitrary
decisions as to which defendants live and which die.  New Hamp-
shire and Connecticut should accept this logic as well.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH PAYNE
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence carves a delicate path be-
tween two pillars.  Capital sentencing must be based on clear and
objective guidelines, which guard against arbitrariness,210 and must
take into account the individualized characteristics of the accused
and circumstances of the offense.211  Victim impact statements,
when used in capital sentencing, run head on into both pillars.
Not only does this type of evidence make arbitrary the decision of
who lives and who dies, but it is irrelevant to the character of the
defendant and circumstance of the offense.212
205 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:§5-II(a).
206 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.150(1)(a); see supra text accompanying note
174.
207 See 17 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19.1 (d)(3); see supra text accompanying note 38.
208 James R. Acker and Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty Under State
Constitutions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1299 (1989).
209 The statute reads:
Victim impact statement read in court prior to imposition of sentence
for crime punishable by death.
. . . .
A victim impact statement prepared with the assistance of a victim advo-
cate to be placed in court files in accordance with subdivision (2) of
subsection (a) of section 54-220 may be read in court prior to imposi-
tion of sentence upon a defendant found guilty of a crime punishable
by death.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46d (2007).
210 Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 615 (Ga. 1974).
211 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1982).
212 Of course, eyewitness testimony regarding the offense is not of the same type.
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Booth and Gathers recognized these two issues and sculpted a
rule that affronted neither pillar.  As such, there is a fundamental
flaw in the Payne decision itself: it overturns two decisions based in
sound law and logic. Payne retracts a constitutional right—the
right to be free of arbitrary decision-making in capital sentenc-
ing—in an area of law measured by evolving standards.
This section of the paper will first show how victim impact evi-
dence violates the Gregg mandate because it creates arbitrary capi-
tal decisions.  Next it will show how victim impact evidence is
irrelevant to capital sentencing.  Because some state courts have
cited relevancy as the justification for prohibiting victim impact
statements, relevancy is indeed what provides a practical ground
for objecting to victim impact evidence in capital trials.  Last, this
section makes a theoretical argument for why Payne should be over-
turned, recognizing that the Payne decision itself was a result of
ideological changes on the Court.  Professor Randall Coyne em-
phasized the futility of seeking relief for the introduction of victim
impact evidence in the United States Supreme Court by creating
this analogy:
Once upon a time, a criminal defendant whose constitutional
rights had been violated could confidently seek relief in the
United States Supreme Court, regardless of the nature of the
criminal charges against her.  Once upon a time, a villager suf-
fering a toothache might profitably repair to the local black-
smith to have the offending tooth removed.  Today, both would
be advised to seek relief elsewhere.213
Unlike the former two sections, this last section does not pro-
vide a tool that is immediately practical to capital lawyers.  Rather it
is a discussion of logic and judicial morality.  In a hypothetical
world, where the Court was composed of personalities that would
consider a return to Booth, lawyers would need to place before
these judges compelling legal, moral, and logical arguments for
overturning Payne.  Hopefully, this section provides that backing.
A. Victim Impact Statements Result in Arbitrary Decisions
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the consideration of arbi-
trary sentencing factors in capital sentencing hearings.  This man-
date originated in Furman and Gregg.214  The Furman Court struck a
213 Randall Coyne, Inflicting Payne on Oklahoma: The Use of Victim Impact Evidence Dur-
ing the Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 589, 611 (1992).
214 214 See Kaine, supra note 18.
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capital statute that allowed for complete jury discretion because, as
Justice Stewart wrote:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.  For, of all
the people convicted of rapes and murders . . . many just as
reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously
selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has
in fact been imposed.215
In Gregg, the Court deemed constitutional a capital statute in
which discretion is “suitably directed and limited so as to minimize
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”216  Notably, the
statute in question contained ten clearly enumerated aggravating
factors.217  Since Gregg, the Court has extended the mandate bar-
ring arbitrary sentencing.218
Arbitrary is defined as “[d]epending on individual discretion”
or “founded on prejudice or preference rather than reason or
fact.”219  Both qualitative logic and quantitative research show that
victim impact evidence does result in arbitrary decisions,220 clearly
violating the Gregg mandate.  Qualitative analysis is clear: it is arbi-
trary to sentence the accused to death based on the ability of the
victim’s family to be present at the trial and effectively communi-
cate their loss to the jury.221
215 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309–310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
216 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
217 Id. at 165 n.9.
218 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (reaffirming its obligation to strike down
death sentences imposed under circumstances that “created an unacceptable risk” of
arbitrariness, caprice or mistake, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant ac-
cused of an interracial capital crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of
the victim’s race and questioned on the issue of racial bias).  Defendant Turner was
granted a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 38.
219 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 85 (8th ed. 2005).
220 See McCleskey, infra note 227; see also Baldus, infra note 227.
221 In an NAACP amicus brief for John Booth, Vivian Berger wrote:
Such characteristics as the articulateness of family members will often
be the products of class or wealth, thereby serving as surrogates for im-
permissible status considerations that no one would claim should influ-
ence capital sentencing.  Further, not only the mode of expression but
also its substance typically encourages the jurors to consider the social
value of the victim and “compare the relative worth of the victim and
the defendant to society.
. . . .
. . . Social worth, as the jurors view it, will also tend to vary with factors
like education, class and wealth, whether of the victim or the survivors—
and, regrettably, often with race or religion as well.
. . . .
. . . By its very nature, this type of evidence invites the jury to “choose up
sides,” to empathize with the (usually more attractive) victim or the vic-
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Victim impact statements are emotional by nature.  Emotional
displays, such as crying on a witness stand, provide important cues
as to how jurors themselves should feel.222  There is an extensive
body of research that proves individuals who witness strong emo-
tional displays may become emotionally aroused themselves.223
The emotional effects are further compounded by concepts of
“psychological equity,” suggesting that individuals may distort facts
to justify punishing an individual,224 and “affect infusion,” sug-
gesting that emotion will influence one’s judgment process when
engaged in constructive information processing.225  Simply put,
empathy confounds clear decision-making.  This results in deci-
sions based on “prejudice or preference rather than reason.”226
Even absent victim impact evidence, juries often consider im-
proper factors in capital sentencing hearings.227  Jurors are over-
tim’s family, in particular where these are white, middle-class, and oth-
erwise similar to most of the jurors.
Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. in Support
of Petitioner at 38–40, Booth, 482 U.S. 496 (No. 86-5020), 1986 WL 727592.
222 As a personal and anecdotal note, this assertion was made painfully clear when
the author observed a recent capital sentencing hearing.  It may seem obvious, but,
when witnesses cried, jurors cried.  For example, numerous jurors wept as the de-
ceased’s cousin read a statement by his adult daughter who was taunted for being
fatherless as a child.  The statement then described the daughter’s experience of
growing up without a father.
When witnesses cracked a joke, jurors laughed.  For example, when the victim’s
former fiancée humorously described the purchase of an “especially ugly” iguana.
Observation of Capital Sentencing Hearing of U.S. v. Caraballo, 282 Fed. Appx. 910,
Mar. 10–14, 2008.
223 See J.C. Coyne, Depression and the response of others, 85 JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 186–93 (1976); C.L. Hammen, and S.D. Peters, Interpersonal consequences of
depression: Responses to men and women enacting a depressed role, 87 JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL
PSYCHOLOGY 322–32 (1978); E.S. Sullins, Emotional contagion revisited: Effects of social
comparison and expressive style on mood convergence, 17 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY BULLETIN 166–174 (1991).
224 See S. Lloyd-Bostock, Attributions of Cause and Responsibility as Social Phenomena, in
J. Jaspars, F. Fincham and M. Hewstone (eds.), ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND RESEARCH,
261–289, San Diego, CA: Academic Press (1983).
225 Joe Forgas, Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model (AIM), 117 PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL BULLETIN 39–66 (1995).
226 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 219.
227 For example, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), which held that discrimi-
natory impact was not enough to sustain an Equal Protection challenge to the death
penalty, made apparent the fact that race plays an enormous role in capital determi-
nations.  The McCleskey case made famous a study showing that defendants who have
been convicted of killing a white victim are 4.3 times more likely to receive a death
sentence. See David C. Baldus, et al., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 140 (Northeastern University Press 1990); see also Phillips,
supra note 203, at 102.
In an amicus brief on behalf of Pervis Payne, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference noted:
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whelmingly white and middle class.228  Studies have observed that
people have more empathy towards people like themselves.  Eco-
nomics, religion, race and ethnicity all play a significant role.229
Although sameness-based empathy is unconscious, it is not benign.
It results in decisions where white, middle class people sentence
those convicted of killing other white, middle class people to much
harsher sentences than those convicted of killing poor, non-white
victims.  Further, overt racism is far from unheard of on capital
juries.230  These biases, while not random when measured on race
and class axes, do produce arbitrary sentences compared to the
heinousness of the crime.  The punishment of some of the worst
crimes is life in prison, while lesser crimes earn the defendant a
death sentence based on the distorting effect the victim impact evi-
dence had on the jury.
Because victim impact statements are subjective in nature and
The race and prominence of the victim are factors which already lurk
dangerously close to the surface in determining whether the death pen-
alty is sought by a prosecutor, whether a plea is offered in exchange for
a less severe sentence, and whether a jury imposes a death sentence.
Overruling Booth would allow the role that the color and standing of the
victim to influence the process beyond constitutionally acceptable
limits.
Brief of Southern Christian Leadership Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 8, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), No. 90-5721, 1991 WL
11007882 at *9.
228 Juries are generally drawn from two sources: voting registration lists and Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicle lists.  These sources under-represent minorities, the poor, and
the young. See State’s Objection to Petition for Writ of Certiorari and for Stay at 10,
State of New Hampshire v. Addison, No. 2007-0737 (N.H. Aug. 30, 2007).
229 Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
361, 399 (1996).
230 An amicus filed on behalf of Pervis Payne describes examples of recorded overt
racism.  It reads in part:
The predominantly white juries selected—whether because of these
practices or because of a low percentage of blacks in the population—
often bring with them to the jury box, either consciously or uncon-
sciously, “racial stereotypes and assumptions” which influence them “in
the direction of findings of black culpability and white victimization, . . .
black immorality and white virtue . . . blacks as social problems and
whites as valued citizens.” See, e.g., Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566,
1576–1578, 1576 n.22 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (many white jurors who sen-
tenced black man to death for murder of white victim demonstrated an
“insensitivity to racial matters” and felt “races should mix to a limited
extent only;” two jurors found blacks “scarier than whites” and two ju-
rors admitted to using the slur “nigger”).
Brief of Southern Christian Leadership Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 227 at 22–23. See also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism
and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1020 n.27 (1988) (describing persons
in our society who “maintain a distance” between themselves and minorities and as a
result are “less likely to feel empathy for minorities due to this distance).
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focus on human characteristics, the effects of discrimination are
compounded.  In practice, they give jurors a tool in which to voice
their prejudices.  They give a reason to vote for death in a situation
where a juror may ordinarily not.  Unlike a clear aggravating fac-
tor, such as whether the murder was conducted by torture—which
is either established or not, a victim impact statement cannot be
“proven.”
Quantitative jury simulation research has shown that the use
of victim impact evidence in capital proceedings produces arbitrary
results.  For example, one study required participants to read one
of four trial summaries.231  The study, while using all first degree
murder scenarios, varied the severity of the crime and the presence
of a victim impact statement.232  One half of the participants read a
victim impact statement similar to the one introduced in Booth; the
other half read no such evidence.233  Where victim impact evidence
was present, 51% of participants voted for the death penalty.234
Where it was absent, only 20% voted for the death penalty.235
Another study produced similar results.  In this study, a victim
impact statement, similar to the one in Payne, was introduced in a
videotaped trial simulation.  The victim’s mother testified that the
death of her daughter had placed emotional, physical, and finan-
cial burdens on her and led to severe emotional trauma in the vic-
tim’s surviving son.  Of the jurors who voted to convict, 67% of
those who viewed the victim impact statement voted for death.  Of
those who did not see the statement, 30% voted for death.236
While these studies may not be flawless,237 they do provide insight
into just how powerful victim impact evidence is.
In light of the Eighth Amendment’s clear mandate barring ar-
bitrary sentencing factors, it seems that the qualitative and quanti-
tative proof of the effects of victim impact statements is alone
sufficient to establish it unconstitutional.
231 James Luginbuhl and Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital Trial:





236 Brian Myers and Jack Arbuthnot, The Effects of Victim Impact Evidence on the Ver-
dicts and Sentencing of Mock Jurors, 29 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 95, 112 (1999).
237 Myers & Greene, supra note 45, at 14 (noting that the studies were conducted
on largely heterogeneous groups and without the effect of real consequences).
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B. Victim Impact Evidence is Irrelevant to Capital Sentencing Decisions
Victim impact evidence also violates the relevance mandate of
the Eighth Amendment.  In Payne, Justice Stevens filed a dissenting
opinion that was as logical as Justice Marshall’s dissent was impas-
sioned.  Stevens cautioned that “relying on nothing more than
those dissenting opinions, the Court abandons rules of evidence
that are older than the Nation itself and ventures into uncharted
seas of irrelevance.”238
The rules of evidence abandoned by the Court are of two
types.  First are the rules of evidence that apply in all cases.  These
are basic rules concerned more with the fairness of the process and
accurate results than with the Constitution.  Second are evidentiary
concerns arising from the Constitution, particularly post-Furman
Eighth Amendment requirements.  That said, the two considera-
tions are not independent of each other.
In many capital jurisdictions, the rules of evidence do not to
apply during capital sentencing hearings.239  However, the Federal
Rules of Evidence, in particular Rules 401 and 403, have been
turned to for guidance240.  In instances where courts have held that
victim impact evidence is inadmissible, the Rules have been dis-
cussed.241  Courts, in those instances, have conducted a close read-
ing of their state’s capital sentencing statute and any relevant
victim impact law using the Federal Rules of Evidence as a guide.
These courts have taken an approach to Lockett that favors defend-
ants, and rejected arguments that victim impact evidence is rele-
vant to an individualized sentencing determination.242
238 Payne, 501 U.S. at 858–859 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
239 See, e.g., State v. Raines, 653 S.E.2d 126, 136 (N.C. 2007) (holding that “the
Rules of Evidence are not controlling in a capital penalty proceeding.”); See also Jason
E. Barsanti, Ring v. Arizona: The Sixth and Eighth Amendments Collide: Out of the Wreckage
Emerges a Constitutional Safeguard for Capital Defendants, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 519, 570 n.455
(listing fourteen states that do not apply their usual rules of evidence in capital sen-
tencing: Ala. Code § 13A-5-45(d) (2002); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141 (West 2001); Miss.
Code Ann. § 99-19-101(1) (1999); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-302 (2002) (amended
2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-1101(4)(b) (Michie 2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.552.1
(2002); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5(III) (1996); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2929.03(D)(1) (West 2001); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(a)(1) (2001); S.D. Codified
Laws § 19-9-14(4) (Michie 2002); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c) (2002); Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(b) (2002); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.060(3) (West 2002);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102(c) (Michie 2002)).
240 FED. R. EVID. 401, 403.
241 See, e.g., Carter, 888 P.2d 629.
242 See Smith, supra note 42; but see Commonwealth v. Means, 565 Pa. 309, 326 (Pa.
2001) (overturning a lower court’s preclusion of victim impact evidence, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania wrote that the state’s “sentencing scheme does not limit the
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Booth relied on a line of cases deriving from Woodson itself.243
In establishing the state of the law the Booth Court cites Zant and
Eddings for the proposition that “a jury must make an ‘individual-
ized determination’ whether the defendant in question should be
executed, based on ‘the character of the individual and the circum-
stance of the crime.’”244  The Court also cited Enmund and reiter-
ated that the consideration of sentencing factors must have “some
bearing on the defendant’s ‘personal responsibility and moral
guilt.’”245  To consider other factors “would create the risk that a
death sentence will be based on considerations that are ‘constitu-
tionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing
proceeding.’”246
The cases the Court cited in Booth had two main streams of
reasoning.  They either dealt with the procedural mandate that
capital sentencing must take into account individualized character-
istics of the defendant; or, they focused on the evolving standards
argument, where the types of death-eligible crimes have been his-
torically narrowed.  For example, in Eddings the Court held youth
was a relevant mitigating factor.247  In Enmund, the Court held it
unconstitutional to execute a defendant with a relatively minor
role—such as the getaway driver—in the murder.248  These cases
remain good law and their logic is still sound.
The Payne majority noted that the Fourteenth Amendment
may exclude victim impact statements, “[i]n the event that [victim
impact evidence is] so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial
fundamentally unfair . . . .”249  This protection is insufficient.  In a
non-capital criminal proceeding, where the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence apply, Rule 403 also protects against this type of prejudicial
evidence.  In a capital prosecution, where death is on the line, a
defendant should be provided more—not fewer—evidentiary
protections.
evidence admissible in the penalty phase to only the information necessary to estab-
lish aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”).
243 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
244 Booth, 482 U.S. 496 at 502 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)).
245 Booth, 482 U.S. at 502 (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801).
246 Booth, 482 U.S. at 502 (citing Zant, 462 U.S. at 885).
247 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 104.
248 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782.
249 Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
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C. Continued Adherence to Payne Affronts Reasoned Notions of Stare
Decisis
“Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court’s deci-
sion making.”250  Marshall’s words marred the Payne majority; the
strength of the decision itself is compromised by the majority’s ea-
gerness to join a populist cause251 and disregard well established
law.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines stare decisis as, “Latin ‘to stand
by things decided.’  The doctrine of precedent, under which it is
necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the
same points arise again in litigation.”252  This principle is crucial in
a common law system because it ensures the law will be applied
consistently to each litigant.253
Chief Justice Rehnquist was correct when he wrote, “stare deci-
sis is not an inexorable command.”254  The validity of his analysis,
in the majority opinion of Payne, ends there.  The Court acknowl-
edged that stare decisis, “promotes the evenhanded, predictable,
and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived in-
tegrity of the judicial process,”255 but went on to state that these
important considerations are reserved for property and contract
cases “where reliance is involved.”256  This assertion is ludicrous.
Pervis Payne continues to sit on death row, awaiting his execu-
tion.257  Demitrius Gathers and John Booth both had their death
sentences overturned by the Supreme Court just a few short years
prior to the affirmation of Payne’s death sentence.  This is not
“predictable,” “consistent,” nor “evenhanded.”258  Just as a party to
a contract relies on a consistent application of the law when decid-
250 Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
251 See Toobin, supra note 41.
252 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (8th ed. 2005).
253 William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COL. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949).
254 Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265–266 (1986)).
255 Payne, 501 U.S. at 828; see also Amy L. Padden, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme
Court: The Role of a Decision’s Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis
After Payne v. Tennessee, 82 GEO. L. J. 1689, 1693 (noting that stare decisis promotes
four principles: certainty, equality, efficiency, and the appearance of justice).
256 Payne, 501 U.S. at 828.
257 An April 11th, 2007 execution date was stayed.  A new date was set for Decem-
ber 2007.  No executions occurred on this date either.  Tennessee had imposed a stay
on all executions pending decision of Baze v. Rees, 128 S.Ct. 1520 (2008).  Following
the Baze decision on April 16, 2008, Tennessee lifted its moratorium.  It executed its
last inmate on September 12, 2007.  Leon Alligood, Tennessee Killer Set to Die in Electric
Chair, USA TODAY, Sep. 11, 2007, at 3A.
258 Payne, 501 U.S. at 828.
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ing to enter a deal—Pervis Payne relied on consistent application
of the law in preparation of his capital defense.
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Payne asserts that precedent
can be overturned—when it is “wrong.”259  “Wrong” does not pro-
vide any objective guidance.  In constitutional law, and Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence in particular, there are two types of
cases.  There are cases that interpret the constitution to expand an
existing constitutional right, and there are cases that interpret the
constitution to constrict an existing constitutional right.  Subjec-
tively, one might see these as “wrong” or “right” decisions but the
law needs objective guidance if it is to achieve any modicum of
consistency.
Scalia also argued that the Payne decision rests solidly, and
therefore the departure from precedent is justified, because, “Booth
. . . conflicts with a public sense of justice keen enough that it has
found voice in a nationwide ‘victims’ rights’ movement.”260  This
invocation of a populist movement, as a justification for overturn-
ing constitutional law, runs contrary to the typical view that the
Court’s role is to protect minority rights in the face of a majority
will.
The Eighth Amendment has been interpreted according to
the “evolving standards of decency.”261  This is one of the few areas
of constitutional law where the Court expressly accepts an evolutive
interpretation of the constitution.262  This method of interpreta-
tion makes the distinction between right expanding and right con-
stricting precedent especially poignant.  When the Court overturns
a precedent that expands a right, it takes a step backwards. Booth
259 After citing to out of context quotations from previous Marshall decisions,
where precedent was overturned, Scalia writes, “Today, however, Justice Marshall de-
mands of us some ‘special justification’—beyond the mere conviction that the rule of
Booth significantly harms our criminal justice system and is egregiously wrong . . . .”
Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring).
260 Payne, 501 U.S. 834 (Scalia, J., concurring).
261 Transcript of Oral Argument, Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra note 1; see also Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
262 In a recent case banning the execution of juveniles within the United States,
Justice Kennedy, who voted with the majority in Payne conceded,
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual pun-
ishments” must be interpreted according to its text, by considering his-
tory, tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and
function in the constitutional design. To implement this framework this
Court has established the propriety and affirmed the necessity of refer-
ring to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society” to determine which punishments are so dispropor-
tionate as to be “cruel and unusual.”
Roper, 543 U.S. at 560–561 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100–01).
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and Gathers protected a defendant’s Eighth Amendment right to be
free from arbitrary decision making in capital sentencing hearings.
Overruling this precedent in Payne runs contrary to other recent
Eighth Amendment law. Ford, Atkins, and Roper, three well-known
and crucial cases, all used the evolving standards argument to limit
the pool of those eligible to be executed.263  Justice Stevens has
described this process as a “one-way ratchet.”264  In short, the Court
looks at trends in one direction—the direction narrowing the pool
that can be executed.  The Court will not look to see if we “have
changed gears and go in the other direction.”265  Contrary to this
reasoning, the Payne Court used a devolving standards argument to
expand the pool of those that might be executed; defendants that
were unfortunate enough to have killed victims with articulate,
white266 family members.
There is an obvious tension between the import of stare deci-
sis on equality, consistency, predictability, and the fact that it is not
an “inexorable command.”  Obviously, different justices accept dif-
ferent guiding principles when considering whether to overturn a
precedent, versus when stare decisis should apply.  Responding to
Marshall’s “power not reason” argument, Scalia observed, “what
would enshrine power as the governing principle of this Court is
the notion that an important constitutional decision with plainly
inadequate rational support must be left in place for the sole rea-
son that it once attracted five votes.”267  This back-and-forth may
sound like a common argument between brothers.  “You’re a
knucklehead” is countered with “no, you’re the knucklehead.”
However, there is more to Marshall’s argument than constitutional
bickering.
After reading his impassioned dissent from the bench, an obvi-
ously upset Marshall resigned from his tenure on the Court.268
The outgoing justice made the link that a mere “change in person-
263 Ford v Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits state from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executions of mentally retarded
criminals are “cruel and unusual punishments” prohibited by Eighth Amendment);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
264 Justice Stevens, oral arguments, Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343, (Apr. 16,
2008) at 41.
265 Id.
266 See Brief of Southern Christian Leadership Conference as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner, supra note 227.
267 Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring).
268 Coyne, supra note 138, at 54.
128 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:87
nel”269 results in a death sentence for Pervis Payne.  Marshall’s hu-
manist approach puts him on the correct, rights-expanding end of
the Eighth Amendment debate, and accordingly he has the moral
and legal authority to invoke the “evolving standards” command
and implore an affirmation of Booth.
CONCLUSION
Victim impact statements have no place in capital decisions.
Even if a state’s general victim impact statute allows victim impact
evidence in non-capital trials, it does not function the same way in
capital sentencing hearings because there are additional procedu-
ral protections afforded to those facing the possibility of a death
sentence.
“Death is different,” and as such, a capital jury’s sentencing
discretion must be controlled by “clear and objective standards so
as to produce [a] non-discriminatory application.”270  A capital sen-
tencing statute must also provide a “meaningful basis for distin-
guishing the few cases in which the [the death penalty is imposed]
from the many cases [in] which it is not.”271
Running parallel to the requirements that a capital sentencing
scheme provide objective guidelines that meaningfully narrow the
class of death eligible defendants are considerations of individual-
ized sentencing.  To withstand constitutional muster a sentencing
scheme must allow for “particularized considerations of relevant
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defen-
dant.”272  The Supreme Court has interpreted this mandate as a
requirement that a sentencer must consider, as a mitigating factor,
“any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death.”273  Victim impact statements serve
neither of the two parallel constitutional mandates.  They are irrel-
evant and arbitrary.
269 Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
270 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).
271 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427–428 (holding that the use of “outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible and inhuman” murder as an aggravating factor is unconstitutional be-
cause all murders could be described as such and therefore no meaningful narrowing
function is served).
272 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
273 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (invalidating the Ohio death penalty statute because it
limited mitigating factors to those enumerated in the statute).
